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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
Ten years ago, “cyber-protest” usually meant active 
engagement with digital online media by protest- or 
activist groups (e.g. van de Donk, 2004). However, with 
the present development and proliferation of online 
digital media, the question of how to understand polit-
ical agency in relation to online media practices has 
become less obvious. Following heady narratives about 
“Facebook revolutions” and “revolutions 2.0”, there 
has emerged a literature where more critical perspec-
tives on protest movements and social media are pre-
sented (e.g. Cammaerts, Mattoni, & McCurdy, 2013; 
Dencik & Leistert, 2015). This approach has turned its 
attention to a number of tensions and contradictions 
that come with the use of social media for social 
change, including issues such as surveillance and cen-
sorship (Hintz, 2015; Redden, 2015), affordances of in-
dividualism (Fenton & Barassi, 2011), commodification 
of users and systemic constraints (Fuchs, 2011; Leis-
tert, 2015), and, affordances of connectivity versus the 
need for anonymity in activist groups (Treré, 2015). 
This article is based on the findings from a previous 
study of online presence of the radical left in Sweden 
(Swedish Media Council, 2014). The ambition is to ad-
dress some of the conflicts above and connect them to a 
recent discussion about online non-participation as a 
strategy (Casemajor, Couture, Delfin, Goerzen, & 
Delfanti, 2015), with the purpose to contribute to our 
understanding of non-participation. My argument is that 
the online practices and use of social media as could be 
observed in milieus associated with the radical left in-
dicates active non-participation and that this, in turn, is 
related to a political ambition to claim autonomy. 
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The argument is structured as follows: After a brief 
background about the nature of the study I will discuss 
the theoretical concepts participation, empowerment 
and autonomy and present the analytical framework, 
followed by notes on method. The analytical part is 
structured from three themes: active and passive non-
participation, abstention and adaptation, and implosion 
of the social. The paper ends with a discussion about the 
possibilities for the concept online non-participation and 
its implications for further, empirical studies. 
1.1. Background  
In contrast to much of what has been published about 
social movements and online media, the study from 
which the material in this article was taken could be 
described as a propaganda study (Jowett & O’Donell, 
1999) designed to chart “anti-democratic and pro-
violent messages on the internet” (Swedish Media 
Council, 2014). It was conducted by the Swedish Media 
Council and initiated by the Swedish government as 
part of an “Action Plan for Protecting Democracy 
against Pro-Violence Extremism”. The task was to de-
scribe where and what type of messages could be 
found online that publicly propagated for ideologically 
motivated violent action, and what could be said about 
recruitment strategies in this material. The question 
was not what these groups do or why, but how they 
present their activity and cause publicly. Much of the 
aim, design, and scope of the study were defined by 
the commissioner, which meant that the findings are 
limited to a quite narrow area of investigation. It is not 
a study of social movements in general, but of a small 
autonomous or anarchist fraction of the radical left 
who publicly display an apologetic sentiment toward 
violence. Nor is it a study exclusively about corporate 
social media, but more broadly defined online media 
that includes organization web sites. 
The findings showed that the radical left, at least in 
the sense as was defined by the assignment, were 
sparse users of online digital media for dissemination 
of propaganda; in contrast to the other groups includ-
ed in the study, especially the extreme right. Instead, 
they seemed to be quite reluctant in adapting to online 
communication. While the original study did not in-
clude measures for examining non-participation, the 
results were of a kind that activates questions about 
participation/non-participation dynamics that moti-
vates a review of these findings in a new theoretical 
context. 
2. Online Non-Participation 
Lately, the scholarly interest in the issue of online non-
participation and disconnection has increased (Cam-
maerts, 2008; Kaun & Schwarzenegger, 2014; Portwood-
Stacer, 2013; Selwyn, 2003). While much of the focus 
of these studies has been on individual motivations for 
abstention, attention has also been drawn to non-
participation as a form of activism (Casemajor et al., 
2015), as well as an interest in the decline of certain 
types of online radical politics (Wolfson, 2014). Still, 
the greater part of the literature that has surfaced 
since the Arabic spring, the Occupy-, and Los Indigna-
dos-movement tends to focus on connectivity, online 
presence and participation (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013; Gerbaudo, 2012; Hands, 2011). In this section I 
will look into some of the theories and models of par-
ticipation and discuss theoretical foundations for un-
derstanding digital non-participation in terms of strat-
egy or protest. Online media here refers to those 
channels and services where messages and content is 
made public on the web; either in the case with social 
networking sites, or in other forms of user-generated 
content, what used to be called web 2.0. Hence, forms 
of private or non-public online communication such as 
e-mail or direct messages are not included in this defi-
nition. The reason is that the original study focused on 
public messages that were easily accessible and pub-
lished with the intent to reach an audience. 
2.1. Social Implosion and Interpassivity 
The idea of non-participation as empowering in rela-
tion to media has been part of what could be described 
as a postmodern critique of social theory, especially as 
articulated by Jean Baudrillard (1988). Even if 
Baudrillard’s work does not present a scholarship that 
offers verifiable theories, some observations and con-
cepts have proven useful figures of thought and 
Baudrillard was early to assess the affordances of an 
abundant information society. One such concept that 
he addressed both politically and philosophically was the 
issue of media-related non-participation. In the essay 
“The Masses: The implosion of the social in the media” 
(Baudrillard, 1988), Baudrillard introduced the idea that 
non-participation should be understood as a rational 
and effective response to a power structure that fos-
tered a hypocritical form of non-communication: 
“I would no longer interpret in the same way the 
forced silence of the masses in the mass media. I 
would no longer see in it a sign of passivity and of 
alienation, but to the contrary an original strategy, 
an original response in the form of a challenge.” 
(Baudrillard, 1988, p. 208) 
Non-participation in this context is not understood 
as hampered citizenship, but as rational and empower-
ing, a position that finds resonance in more recent ac-
counts of non-participation (Casemajor et al., 2015). 
The challenge is directed toward a system that requires 
of its population a symbolic engagement: to have opin-
ions, to be well-informed, to make conscious choices. 
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What Baudrillard opposes is the equation of participa-
tion with empowerment—a theory of empowerment 
that only acknowledges active participation is seen as 
hypocritical and quite useless; a more efficient form of 
opposition would be to refuse to participate. While 
Baudrillard’s level of analysis makes grand claims with 
little-to-none empirical grounding, his change in per-
spective should also be added to the recent debate on 
strategic non-participation also when it comes to digi-
tal media.  
The backdrop for Baudrillard’s argument was a Marx-
ist understanding of mass media as a tool for manipula-
tion of the masses. In the digital era, manipulation and 
false consciousness may not hold the same position in 
critical thought, even if the notion of filter bubbles 
(Pariser, 2011), is an example of updated suspicion 
about media manipulation (“what the internet is hiding 
from you”). Its legacy is also present in discussions about 
involuntary participation where notions of social media’s 
affordances of visibility and individualism have been 
commented on by scholars (Fenton & Barassi, 2011; 
Fuchs, 2014; Poell & van Dijck, 2015). Furthermore, the 
challenge in digital media can also be approached 
through the concept of interpassivity (Dean, 2009; Žižek, 
1998), described as the opposite to interactivity. Origi-
nally developed as a critical term in order to explain how 
mediated quasi-interactivity functions as stand-in for re-
al engagement, it has come to use in discussions about 
online engagement/disengagement and what is some-
times called “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2011), where taking 
part in online petitions and campaigns become stand-in 
for actual social engagement and activism.  
2.2. Participation and Empowerment 
Participation is a key feature of digital life (Kelty, 2015). 
The concept, however, is polysemous and it is quite dif-
ficult to define what qualifies as participation. This 
means that any attempt to build conceptual models for 
participation/non-participation has to be dynamic 
(Casemajor et al., 2015). In the field of media studies, 
at least two theoretical conceptualizations of participa-
tion co-exist. On the one hand, there is the tradition 
that understands participation as a term connected 
with the political, e.g. in form of democratic delibera-
tion (Dahlgren, 2014). On the other hand, there is the 
notion theoretically based in cultural studies about ac-
tive audiences and audience participation, which 
gained new status with the rise of digital, interactive 
media. Media studies harbor both these conceptual 
understandings that sometimes lead to tensions (as 
could be illustrated by the dialogue in Jenkins & Car-
pentier, 2013). But what brings them together is that 
they both address the notion of empowerment.  
Definitions of empowerment are manifold and 
range from individual aspects such as psychological 
enhancement, and self-awareness, to more social and 
political where both individuals and groups achieve a 
status of autonomy (Freire, 2000; Rodriguez, 2001). 
Sometimes empowerment is described as a scale from 
self-awareness to political action (Higgins, 1999). In the 
context of this article, empowerment should be under-
stood in relation to autonomy rather than self-
awareness. Much of the literature on mediated partici-
pation has concentrated on the question of empower-
ment (Castells, 2009; Dahlgren, 2009) and participation 
(Carpentier, 2011; Jenkins, 2008). Some of these schol-
ars have pointed to online social media’s role in increas-
ing civic engagement and political participation for citi-
zens (Castells, 2009). One could say that the position 
taken by these scholars has equated empowerment with 
participation, and accordingly the idea that more par-
ticipation equals more autonomy has taken hold.  
Notions of empowerment and digital media have 
been connected with the problem of the unequal dis-
tribution of access to the internet, popularly referred 
to as the digital divide (e.g. Norris, 2001). Lately, with 
the expansion of internet access on a global scale, in-
terests in various types of digital divides, in terms of 
social inequalities have gained ground in critical re-
search (Danielsson, 2014; Livingstone & Helsper, 2007). 
This means that focus has changed from asking if peo-
ple have the possibility to go online, to asking what 
they do when online. Here again, the question of em-
powerment becomes important since there are struc-
tural limitations to how digital media can be used. 
Along traditional lines of active and passive media use, 
online digital media can be used as a means for politi-
cal participation (simulating the golden days of public 
sphere) or as mere passive consumption (the decline of 
the public sphere). However, there is yet another type 
of relation to digital media and empowerment that 
does not fit into these categories, namely the acts of 
deliberate non-participation. 
2.3. Models of Non-Participation 
An interesting paradox in relation to the discussion 
about participation and empowerment above is that 
much of the developments in today’s digital media 
could be described in terms of forced or involuntary 
participation: online mainstream media invite us to 
“like” and share content with our social networks, 
while smartphones gathers data over our mobility and 
communication (Dahlgren, 2014). The idea of participa-
tion has been a central part of all theorization about 
the internet, in terms of affordances for interactivity or 
user-generated content (Kelty, 2015). One recurring 
critique from critical internet scholars has been that 
power relations have too easily been eradicated from 
theories on participation and that digital media partici-
pation creates new or reinforces existing structures of 
unequal distribution of power (Beer, 2009; Cammaerts, 
2008; Goldberg, 2010). 
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One reason for taking an interest in non-
participation is that it could (and should) be under-
stood as a politically significant action (Casemajor et 
al., 2015, p. 851). This means that in an era of forced 
participation that serves the interest of existing power 
structures, one way of opposition is to refuse to partic-
ipate. This insight is part of the dynamic model of 
online participation/non-participation proposed by 
Casemajor et al.: “The framework…is an attempt at go-
ing beyond the linear model of participation and show-
ing that non-participation cannot just be considered as 
hampered citizen action or passivity; it can also be em-
powering” (2015, p. 863).  
The model sketches four possible types of participa-
tion: active participation, passive participation, active 
non-participation, and passive non-participation. And 
in the case of active non-participation, three ideal 
types of action are defined. The first one is obfuscation 
which means to act in ways to diffuse data gathering 
online, through erratic behavior that renders collected 
data useless. The second type of active non-
participation is called sabotage and includes strategies 
to disrupt digital platforms, for instance, denial of ser-
vice-attacks on websites. The final ideal type is exodus 
and simply means withdrawal from digital platforms, 
sometimes in order to create own. 
The model proposed by Casemajor et al. (2015) 
shows some resemblance to a model developed by 
Rucht (2004) called the “Quadruple ‘A’”; a model that 
presented four ideal types of communicative strategies 
that social movements have developed in relation to 
unfavorable mainstream media coverage. Building on 
data dating back to the 1960s and onwards, Rucht 
identifies four strategies on an axis between inward-
and outward oriented strategies; as well as strategies 
with low or high resource demands: abstention and at-
tacks on mainstream media are not very resource-
demanding. The former means avoiding publicity and 
“keeping to oneself” while the other allows interac-
tions with mainstream media but voices mistrust. Al-
ternatives and adaptation, on the other hand, are 
strategies with quite high resource demands where the 
former means creating own media outlets and the lat-
ter to enact events that might attract the attention of 
mass media (Rucht, 2004, p. 46). Two of these strate-
gies, abstention and alternative are directed inwards, 
while attack and adaptation are outward-looking. 
Rucht (2011) has later commented on the implications 
of online digital media for his model, acknowledging 
the possibilities but warning about over-estimating the 
importance of digital media (p. 259). 
2.4. Activism and Media Practice 
The role of digital media in mobilization among radical 
groups is well-researched (Askanius, 2012; Neumayer, 
2013). In a study of online counter publics associated 
with the extreme right and radical left, Neumayer 
(2013) argues that in order to understand how these 
groups make use of digital media, one has to look at 
three dimensions: technological affordances; strate-
gies, tactics and media practices; as well as political po-
sitions and ideology. Consequently, media practices do 
not exist in a vacuum but should be understood in rela-
tion to both technology and ideology. Mattoni (2012, 
2013) discusses media practice as part of wider reper-
toires of communication in social movements. In that 
context, repertoires include both participation and 
non-participation in terms of interactions with media 
technologies, media outlets and media professionals, 
what Mattoni refers to as “relational media practices” 
(Mattoni, 2013, p. 49). 
When approaching media practices and repertoires 
of communication from the perspective of ideology, 
notions of empowerment and autonomy again become 
relevant. Langlois & Dubois (2005) discuss autonomous 
media strategies, as attempts to “bypass mainstream 
media through experimentation with new forms of 
democratic communication” (Langlois & Dubois, 2005, 
p. 23). On a similar note, Milan (2013) speaks of appro-
priation of means of communication by social move-
ments in terms of “liberated technologies” and part of 
“emancipatory communication practices” (Milan, 2013, 
p. 2). This, in turn, is related to the practices of the au-
tonomist leftist tradition of creating and claiming au-
tonomous spaces in the social landscape (e.g. Katsiafi-
cas, 2006). Following this, it is possible to understand 
ideologically motivated non-participation as part of the 
media practices and repertoires of communication in 
radical groups. 
The perspectives outlined above constitute an ana-
lytical framework that turns attention to participa-
tion/non-participation dynamics, as well as issues of 
autonomy and empowerment in an ideological context. 
3. Material and Method 
As already mentioned, the original study was designed 
as a propaganda study, i.e. an investigation into modes 
of address and means of persuasion as employed by 
groups advocating violent means for an ideological 
cause. The method was a qualitative content analysis 
of digital media and online platforms, with a focus on 
text analysis (semiotics, discourse analysis). The mate-
rial consisted of online content produced within three 
ideological milieus that were pre-defined by the as-
signment: the extreme right, militant jihadist and the 
autonomous left.1 While there are many aspects that 
                                                          
1 The governmental action plan and its use of terms such as 
“anti-democratic” and “pro-violent” have been contested by so-
cial activists and academics, especially because of a tendency to 
equate extra parliamentary activism and civil disobedience with 
extremism. For an overview of this debate, see Kaun (2015). 
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separate these types of movements, they had been 
targeted by officials as environments with a potential 
to propagate for violent actions for an ideological 
cause. It should be said that the sample was quite lim-
ited since the content up for analysis had to meet the 
criteria for voicing an extreme stand in favor of political 
violence. Few groups or online content did this and the 
material analyzed here was published in milieus in and 
around militant anti-fascist and militant animal rights 
groups. Needless to say, this is a marginal phenomenon 
in context of the radical left activist scene online, but it 
stood out in terms of communication strategies in 
comparison to what could be observed in the material 
published in the extreme right milieu where more ag-
gressive discourses were present. In all, three websites 
associated with the militant fringe of the radical left 
were observed: antifa.se, revfront.org, and djurensbe-
frielsefront.org, and of these only revfront.org could be 
described as active. These are also strictly closed mi-
lieus that seldom engage in propaganda or open re-
cruitment. “Act without being seen” has been a motto 
and this might be true also for how participation in dig-
ital media is organized. 
The analysis consisted of three parts: first, a de-
scription of pro-violent communication as could be 
found in the online milieu associated with the radical 
left; thereafter followed a charting of the web pres-
ence of three groups that had been identified as 
groups who met the criteria of openly expressing 
themselves in favor of ideologically motivated violence. 
Finally, the report included a thematic analysis of 
online videos published on YouTube (for a full account, 
see Swedish Media Council, 2014, pp. 132-190).  
In the review of these findings, it is important to 
acknowledge the communicative modalities and af-
fordances provided by online, digital media. What qual-
ifies as online content is not restricted to symbolic ex-
pressions in the form of words, images, video and 
audio, but could also include possibilities for interac-
tion that are part of the communication practice and 
experience, or a social, or network media logic (Klinger 
& Svensson, 2015; Van Dijck & Poell, 2013). To like, 
link, share, and comment are activities that have be-
come part of meaningful communication and by look-
ing into how these activities are activated, one can get 
the sense of how digital media communication works 
in the studied environment. The study did not analyze 
user interaction, but paid attention to affordances for 
interactivity, and how these were used. 
4. Analysis 
The following argument is structured in order to ad-
dress two sets of questions: what types of non-
participation can be identified in the online activities of 
the radical left, and, how can this material be concep-
tualized in relation to theories on activist media prac-
tices? The analysis has been thematically divided into 
three categories: active and passive forms of non-
participation; abstention and adaptation; as well as the 
implosion of the social online. 
4.1. Active and Passive Non-Participation 
The most visible form of non-participation that appears 
in the material is “exodus”, i.e. instances of apparent 
withdrawal from online communication. The other 
types of active non-participation that are described in 
Casemajor’s et al. (2015) model, obfuscation and sabo-
tage, are not represented in the material. The with-
drawals can come in different guises, either in terms of 
complete exodus, i.e. closing down web sites, or in 
semi-withdrawals as in turning off or limit communica-
tive affordances. Both are result of active choice. 
When it comes to complete exodus, this can be ob-
served in the case with antifa.se, web site for a militant 
antifascist group Antifascist action (AFA). It had been 
on the web since the early 2000s but was apparently 
disconnected around 2010. Hence, the site was not in 
operation during the sample period. A similar case of 
probable exodus was djurensbefrielsefront.org, a web 
site by DBF, the Swedish branch of militant animal 
rights activists: Animal Liberation Front. The site was 
still accessible but gave the impression of having been 
abandoned, the last updates dated back to 2010. 
Online communities and chat forums dedicated to 
the radical left were filled with speculations on wheth-
er AFA still exist at all, since they showed no presence 
online. The quote below is an example from this type 
of discussion on socialism.nu, a leftist online communi-
ty, and is an answer to questions about the exist-
ence/non-existence of AFA: 
“Oh, yes. They’re still here. Their activities haven’t 
disappeared with the web site. That line of thinking 
originates from how the Nazis organize themselves. 
There, they have tons of Web sites but little or no 
activity IRL. It’s a good thing that AFA does not 
spend time building digital “castles in the air”. 
Those who need to know about AFA’s existence will 
certainly see it =)” (https://www.socialism.nu/show 
thread.php?t=6164&page=8) 
Even if we do not know how well-informed this 
commentator is regarding the issue, the response 
bears witness to a notion of active non-participation. 
Furthermore, the quote highlights another aspect apart 
from mere presence/absence, as it makes a clear dis-
tinction between online activities and activities in the 
“real” world. By describing online activity as “building 
digital castles in the air”, the commentator gives voice 
to a view where “real” action is preferred over symbol-
ic action. This could also be seen as an outcome of ide-
ological positioning and an act of distinguishing them-
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selves from political opponents by means of its view on 
and understanding of media practices. Haunss (2015) 
addresses the issue of online/offline-dynamics and 
notes that much of the recent literature on protest 
movement’s social media practices stresses the role of 
preexisting social ties in mobilization (p. 26). This has 
been noted in previous studies on autonomous scenes, 
where personal interaction is preferred above mediat-
ed communication (Leach & Haunss, 2009).  
The study focused on content that was accessible 
and could be observed; hence, it is not correct to speak 
of full non-participation. However, there are examples of 
what could be described as semi-withdrawals from 
online communication. One such example is the 
YouTube channels RevFrontMedia and RevFrontMedia2, 
both associated with the militant group Revolutionary 
Front (RF), who, at the time of the study had published 
in total 19 videos online depicting violent confrontations 
with neo-Nazis and the vandalizing of homes and prop-
erties of people claimed to be associated with the ex-
treme right. While the publication of these videos argu-
ably is an example of online participation, they also 
display a tension between active non-participation and 
passive participation. This manifested itself through the 
use of the comment function, which is pre-set by 
YouTube to be automatically attached to the published 
video. This comment function can however be deac-
tivated, and this has been done for all of the videos 
published by RevFrontMedia. Since the deactivation 
requires an active choice, it is fair to argue that this al-
so could be interpreted in line with the argument of ac-
tive non-participation. At least, it does not invite view-
ers to participate or communicate through the means 
of the affordances of this type of digital media.  
4.2. Abstention and Adaptation 
While the exodus strategies described above could be 
filed under what Rucht (2004) named “abstention”, i.e. 
to avoid attention from mass media and keep to one-
self, there are examples in the material of strategies 
that rather meet the criteria of “adaptation”. Rucht 
(2004) describes adaptation as an extrovert strategy 
with considerable high resource demands where activ-
ist groups plan their activities with (mass) media atten-
tion in mind. For the adaptation strategy, the distinc-
tion between “real” and symbolic action is less 
articulated which means that actions that are “unsuc-
cessful” in meeting their concrete aims can still be 
deemed successful if they achieve the right media at-
tention (e.g. DeLuca, 1999).  
One example of adaptation to media attention in 
the material is the Facebook-account and logo that RF 
launched during the sample period. It could be added 
that this addition of a Facebook page in late 2012 does 
not make the group appear as early adopters when it 
comes to social media. This arguably late awakening 
does not lessen the enthusiasm; the launch was an-
nounced in quite high-flown manner on the website 
revfront.org: 
“[Revolutionary Front] is an organization that con-
stantly strives for improvement and to take steps 
forward in our political work. We understand the 
importance of being seen in public space, both on 
the streets and on the Internet. We have therefore 
chosen to start a Facebook page. A page that, we 
hope, our readers will appreciate. The page will 
serve as a tool for spreading our news and to reach 
out to more people with our political message.” 
(http://revfront.org/?p=5465) 
With Mattoni’s (2012, 2013) concept “relational 
media practices” it becomes possible to approach ad-
aptation as not only an adaptation of activist groups to 
media logics in order to attract the attention of main-
stream media professionals, as described by Rucht 
(2004), but to also understand adaptation in relation to 
technological affordances. The quote above could be 
seen as an example of adaptation where the group 
adapts its action to the requirements or logics of a me-
dia technology, in this case online social media. Milan 
(2015) writes about a “politics of visibility” (p. 63) 
brought about by social media, a politics that allows 
surveillance and mass scrutiny and makes activist 
groups vulnerable to political adversaries and the state. 
There are good reasons to abstain from using these 
services, but Milan’s (2015) research has pointed to a 
sense of inevitability of corporate social media that 
leads protest groups and activists to a resignation to 
the unwanted consequences of being present in corpo-
rate social media. The Facebook page in itself could be 
seen as a form of adaptation. 
However, the words by which this Facebook page 
was announced bear witness to an understanding of 
Facebook as, not primarily a means for reciprocal 
communication, but for broadcasting political messag-
es. There are also formulations that declare that this 
move is partly motivated by the ambition to reach out 
to outsiders. However, the announcement says nothing 
about using the Facebook page as a platform for con-
tact and communication, but seems to treat it more as 
a tool for broadcasting political messages. This tendency 
becomes even clearer as they describe political messag-
es as “propaganda”, a term probably more associated 
with totalitarian ambitions of manipulation through me-
dia than social and reciprocal communication: 
“After ten years as an organization we are also 
proud to present the [Revolutionary Front] logo! It 
will represent the organization and mark our prop-
aganda.” (http://revfront.org/?p=5465) 
The mode of communication employed could be 
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described in terms of a complicated tension between 
secrecy and visibility. Communication is reduced to 
one-way channels of information rather than to share 
and create a sense of community. Comments-functions 
are turned off, and overall, the communication af-
fordances provided for interaction and reciprocal 
communication are not put to use in any considerable 
extent. One way to approach this is to see it as “aso-
cial” media practices. 
4.3. Implosion of the Social Online 
A common definition of social media is that it refers to 
media services that enable reciprocal communication 
between humans, and provides some sense of com-
munity (cf. Fuchs, 2014, p. 1). When observing the use 
of social networking sites and digital media in the sam-
ple, it appears as if the way that these services have 
been put to use renounces some of those modalities of 
communication and community-building that makes 
them “social”. In accordance with the discussion about 
semi-withdrawal above, it is a complex act of being pre-
sent without full participation, similar to passive forms 
of participations such as lurking (Crawford, 2011). 
A first example of “asocial” online presence is RF 
who are active in publishing propaganda on the web 
and in social media, but seem more cautious when it 
comes to sociability online. The content that is pub-
lished is not aimed at recruiting sympathizers; it does 
little to promote the positive and inspiring sides of be-
ing associated with RF or participating in their actions 
(perhaps it is not be necessary to advertise—potential 
followers might be attracted or motivated by other in-
centives than to seek for a social community). It might 
also be more important for various reasons to keep in-
ternal activities secret than it is to put themselves on 
display (other than through their actions). Anyone 
wishing to come in contact with the group is directed 
to e-mail or a pre-paid mobile phone number. There 
was a @revfront Twitter-account but it was closed for 
outsiders—only accepted followers could read its 
tweets and see the number of followers. 
The asocial online presence is also true for the oth-
er groups; AFA and DBF are even more reclusive, the 
latter explicitly discouraging people from attempting to 
make contact with them. Leach and Haunss (2009) 
have noted how autonomist activist scenes build heavi-
ly on personal contacts and direct communication, 
which might help explain this desire to redirect users 
from the online platforms to other means of communi-
cation that are more direct and personal. 
Secondly, many of the services for publishing content 
online are social per default, and hence set limits for the 
control over content. As has already been mentioned, 
RevFrontMedia had switched off the commenting-
functions for their YouTube-videos, but the display of 
these videos is companied by a list of suggestions for 
similar videos presented in the right-hand margin on the 
YouTube web site. On many occasions during the sample 
period, the viewer was given suggestions for videos pro-
duced and published by right-wing extremist groups. 
Hence, when using YouTube as a tool for broadcasting 
propaganda, there is a risk that it provides unintentional 
attention to propaganda from political enemies.  
Finally, articles and communiques published in the 
milieu are written by pseudonyms or unidentifiable col-
lectives. This anonymity feeds into an overarching 
strategy of secrecy that is complemented by photo-
graphs depicting people in ski-masks or a casual cus-
tom of blurring out faces from photographs and videos. 
Who these individuals are remains a secret. One of the 
things that social networking sites brought to online 
culture was identity. Where previous forms of online 
communities had been characterized by a logic where 
identities were disconnected from physical reality (“On 
the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”) (Turkle, 
1995), My Space and Facebook brought back tradition-
al modes of identification (“On the internet, everybody 
knows you’re a dog”) (see Gershon, 2011). Fenton and 
Barassi (2011) have noted how social media is built on 
a “politics of individuation” that stands in a contradic-
tory position to collective action, solidarity and partici-
pation. For groups that traditionally have valued its se-
crecy, sometimes on good grounds regarding a history 
of surveillance and infiltration of groups on the marginal 
left, the priority to keep oneself hidden is in conflict with 
the visibility paradigm of digital media. Furthermore, 
Fenton and Barassi (2011) argue that the logic of self-
centered participation promoted by social media can 
represent a threat for political groups rather than an op-
portunity. This tension reflects an ideological contradic-
tion within autonomist tradition between individual lib-
erty and collective solidarity. Autonomist politics have 
sometimes been described as a “politics in the first per-
son” (Leach & Haunss, 2009, p. 262). Related to this, life-
style politics and slacktivism has long been targeted as a 
problematic consequence of social media activism. 
The process of de-socialization could be understood 
both as an extension of a tradition of secrecy within 
the milieu, but also a strategy of how to oppose a 
technical architecture that reduces the ability to con-
trol over content. Put another way, the conflict be-
tween control and emancipation as identified by 
Dencik and Leistert (2015) is relevant here as well. The 
groups that were included in the study constituted a 
very secluded milieu. They did not show much interest 
in using the web to attract new followers or recruit ac-
tivists. Control over content appeared to be more im-
portant than sociability.  
5. Discussion: Non-Participation and Empowerment 
Previous research on militant groups associated with 
the radical left have pointed out that these groups sel-
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dom take an active part in designing propaganda or 
make efforts to reach out for new possible sympathizers 
(e.g. Peterson, 2001). Propaganda is understood as a 
means associated with the extreme right. It is therefore 
not surprising to find the type of active non-participation 
presented in the analysis. Theoretically, we can assume 
that there are numerous reasons for these kinds of 
groups to abstain from online communication and cor-
porate social media (Dencik & Leistert, 2015). Still, as 
was shown in the empirical analysis, abstention is not 
total, but rather selective and partial. From these find-
ings we can make the following observations: 
First, empowerment is a complex term (and it is dif-
ficult to speak of empowerment without hearing the 
voice of those assumedly empowered). Still, if we un-
derstand empowerment partly as acts to claim auton-
omy, it is possible to review much of the online media 
practices described above as active non-participation 
with claims to autonomy. It is clear that much of the 
non-participation is a consequence of active choice. 
The groups are present online, but they have orches-
trated their presence in a way that reduces the degree 
of participation, for instance by disabling possibilities 
for commenting and keeping strict directives of how to 
get contacted.  
Following this, when these milieus are put in a his-
torical context, it shows that they have a tradition of 
“acting without being seen” which collides with the af-
fordances of connectivity and visibility of social media. 
This tradition, in turn, might help explain the tendency 
to treat online media as channels for the broadcasting 
of propaganda (rather than open it up for reciprocal 
communication) as a form of non-participation. 
6. Conclusions 
From what we have seen in this study, there are clear 
instances of active non-participation in digital media in 
the milieus included in the sample, which opens the 
field for further inquiries about activism and non-
participation as media practice. Because this study was 
limited to analyses of online content, questions that 
concern intentions are beyond its scope. Hence, fur-
ther research into the strategy and political implica-
tions of disconnection and non-participation would be 
instrumental to complement these findings, as well as 
would also efforts to put them in historical and geo-
graphical contexts. Such research would require a dif-
ferent methodological approach, preferably including 
interviews. In addition to this, the question of how a 
certain ideological position is associated with a media 
practice that builds on non-participation is worth elab-
oration, especially considering possible variations be-
tween different ideological groups. Given its limita-
tions, the study shows how a non-participation-
framework can provide a fresh perspective for under-
standing activism in the digital age. 
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